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BOOK REVIEWS
SIR EDwARD MARSHAmL HALL, by Edward
Majoribanks, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1929. Pp. xiv, 471.

FOR THE DEFENcE-THE LiFE OF

In one of his novels less well known, perhaps, than some of the others,
Anthony Trollope made this acute observation: "The best of the legal profession consists in this-that when you get fairly at work you may give over
working. An aspirant must learn everything; but a man may make his fortune at it, and know almost nothing. He may examine a witness with judgment, see through a case with precision, address a jury with eloquence and
yet be altogether ignorant of law. But he must be believed to be a very pundit
before he will get a chance of exercising his judgment, his precision or his
eloquence." A serious minded counsellor, half buried under the annual avalanche of reports, statutes and digests that he has no time to read and fears to
throw away, may offer an emphatic negative to so blissful a view of a many
sided and much misunderstood profession. Yet, in the case of the advocate,
there is an element of truth in Trollope's assertion. The book learning of the
trial lawyer does not have to be extensive; his reading is of human character
in the dock, on the bench, and in the jury box.
Sir Edward Marshall Hall, the subject of this memoir, is an apt illustration of this view. It is related that early in his career he remarked to a young
colleague: "I mean to specialize in the two biggest gambles there are; life
and death-freedom and imprisonment. Facts not principles for me. I don't
know much law, but I can learn what there is to be known about men and
women." In this sentence Marshall Hall, as he was generally known, summed
up his vocation.
Called to the bar in 1883, "taking silk" or becoming a
leader, in 1898, during a long career of more than forty years, until his death
in 1927, he held a brief in almost every celebrated murder trial of his time
and enjoyed a great reputation as an astute counsel for the defence. He also
appeared in many civil cases of the sort that attract public attention. Tall,
handsome, vigorous, eloquent, he was just the type to become a public favorite;
his social charm made him many friends. The author of his biography, who
knew him as a junior associate, paints an attractive portrait, showing his varied
gifts and how cheerfully and courageously he bore domestic tragedy and
physical affliction. One could not ask for a more sympathetic biographer,
and, as the contemporary scene disappears under the gentle erasing hand of
time, Sir Edward's best chance for remembrance lies in this book. For the
advocate's fame, like the actor's, is ephemeral, and of all the leading counsel
of the day, his name, as his biographer admits, was most frequently in the
newspapers and most rarely in the official law reports.
The method he followed was quite simple, and not uncommon with lawyers
who practice habitually in the criminal courts; it was his ability in applying il
that was notable. Leaving points of law to his juniors, he would concentrate
on the facts, by skillful cross-examinations would extract or suggest an alternative solution to that of the prosecution, and then by a dramatic appeal tc
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the jury snatch a verdict in spite of the judge. This did not endear him to
the judiciary; on two occasions he gave an opportunity for an enemy on the
bench to reprimand him for exceeding the proper limits of advocacy, and
in civil cases his verdicts were more than once set aside to his chagrin. In
his impetuosity he was sometimes rude to the court. But he learned caution,
and the personal regard in which he was held in his later years mellowed the
asperities of the forum. To the general public that loves fervid oratory he
remained a celebrity to the end.
The work is a biography, but in addition a picture of life at the Common
Law bar of England, its etiquette, discipline and conventions. Mr. Majoribanks
also with great pains and dramatic skill, has revewed the principal murder
trials in England during.the last generation; sorry and sordid tales they are
at the best, but of the sort that many readers never tire of. The detective
novel seems trite besides these true stories of vice and crime. But besides
making the flesh of the lay reader creep, there is much in the trial technique of
professional interest to the American lawyer, always curious about a system
of justice so strangely similar to and yet so unlike his own. One or two less
obvious points may be mentioned. In the course of an action for libel Marshall Hall inadvertently trod on the toes of l great publisher. From that time
be was the victim of a subtle and malicious campaign of newspaper disparagement that nearly ruined his practice and ended only when he succeeded in
making his peace with the august personage he had offended. It is a grim
reminder of the power of the modern publisher whom none, not even a popular and pugnacious lawyer, may offend with impunity. Another thingSir Edward never professed to any interest in legal learning. He was a getter
of verdicts and disliked, with reason, to argue in the court of appeal. His
remarkable success in the conduct of trials gives semblance of plausibility to
the romantic legend that the inferior student in college will in real life outstrip the honor man. Marshall Hall, only a pass man, which is not much at
an English University, no doubt did by his eloquence and dramatic powers
outshine many scholarly fellow students at Cambridge. But hii continued indifference to legal science was to make his career in a sense a showy failure.
One after another his brilliant contemporaries, and then his juniors, were elevated to the bench and woolsack while he remained in harness as a K. C. to
the end. He hid his disappointment and generously congratulated his friends
on their advancement but no promotion came his way. And candor compels
one to admit that the authorities were right. He did not have the learning,
the poise, the detached mental attitude requisite for the High Court.
What sort of career a man of his stamp, a genius in his own way, could
have made at the American bar is an interesting speculation. The country is
too decentralized to enable a leader of the criminal bar to acquire easily a
national reputation. Local bars are jealous o.f outsiders and juries suspicious.
The prisoner as a rule has a better chance with a local man than a distinguished strzinger; shows like the Scopes trial are uncommon. Not a success
in Parliament, he might have found in the less critical atmosphere of American politics an emotional outlet and pathway to fame. In the Senate his
eloquence, histrionic talent and meager learning would have found congenial
company. But as an American it is unlikely that he would have come to
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the bar. Dr. Franklin, a shrewd observer of American ways once said:
"Lawyers, preachers and tomtit's eggs, there are more of them hatched than
come to perfection." The philosopher saw with uncanny wisdom that humanism would have but a subordinate part in the development of this continent,
by the hungry hordes eager for the material comfort denied to their ancestors.
The learned professions, in fact, thrive only as accessories to economic realism.
The conviction or acquittal of a dozen criminals, just or unjust, may entertain
readers of the tabloids, but will make less impression on the average solid
citizen than a fluctuation in the quotation for General Motors. Sir Edward,
had he been an American would have gone into business promptly, and employed profitably that rare taste for jewelry and antiques that he cultivated
as a hobby; matching diamonds and pearls for Park Avenue, or giving to the
apartments of entrepreneurs a false appearance of ancient culture through
the forlorn vestiges of lost families and abandoned homes.
Law School.
University of Pennsylvania
FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

William H. Lloyd.

By Jacques Rueff.

Translated

by Herman Green. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, i929. Pp.
- xxxiv, 159.
The credit for the translation of this delightful monograph from the
French to the English is due to the Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of
Law. The text by Mr. Rueff does not deal directly with legal science; there
is no explicit reference to it. Its thesis is well described in the preface. The
book represents a part of the
"current and widespread discussion of the development of the scientific
habit of thought and of the logic and philosophy underlying scientific
methods. Of wider interest and of even more importance is the book's
contribution to the effort now being made in many quarters to borrow
from the physical sciences their more exact, objective and fruitful methods
for use in the social sciences."
Mr. Rueff may be described as a Neo-Kantianist or perhaps as a positivist;
labels are not very helpful in describing contemporary philosophers. With
Henri Poincar6' and others in Europe, and William James, Dr. Edgar A.
Singer, Jr., and others' in this country, he describes the physical scientist
as an artist, as the creator and not the discoverer of his laws. "The point
of departure is living man grappling with this something which resists him,
which he calls reality and which reveals itself to him only in a succession of
sensations and nothing else..... A law is the expression of a sequence of
events." General laws are the product of artistic imagination creating, for
ease of description, similarities out of heterogeneous sensations. A law which
'Cited in the text, pp. 33, 55.
2
SINGER, MIND AS BEHAVIOUR (1924)
especially 187 et seq., and 285 el
seq. Mr. Justice Holmes in his "Coizcrap PAPERS" (1921) 303 in an article
entitled "Ideals and Doubts" cites Morris R. Cohen and Del Vecchio as taking
the same position. He, however, sounds a note of caution in the application
of the method to legal problems.
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describes the succession of sensations is true so long and only so long as events
as they transpire and are observed continue to be accurately described by the
law. And this is the fundamental concept, not new in the history of thought,
but unrecognized by a great many physical as well as social scientists, which
Mr. Rueff sets forth as a result of a general consideration of the method
of science.
" . . the Law of Causality, which seems to be the expression of physical
reality independent of ourselves, owes its existence merely to the effort
of our mind to impose that law upon the world.
rn the last part of his book, Mr. Rueff attempts to show that exactly the same
procedure is applicable to the social sciences, taking ethics and political economy as examples.

What value has such a study for the lawyer? There is perhaps no profession which pays greater or blinder tribute to the magical efficacy oflogic
and theory. This is brought out forcibly in an introduction by Mr. Herman
Oliphant and Mr. Abram Hewitt. 'A true science consists of an empirical
branch which gathers observations, and a rational branch which orders the
observations and creates tentative laws. Of course in practice the two
branches can never be clearly isolated. The tools of the empirical branch are
primarily the sensory organs, of the rational branch, deductive and inductive
logic and intuition. But deductive logic is merely a tool for detecting contradictions, for "localizing doubt." Inductive logic and intuition (perhaps
we might say "or intuition") are procedures of research, not of proof. The
entire rational branch of a science is purely formal, the results arrived at depend entirely on the sensory experiences which are put into this "gristmill."
As is pointed out in the introduction, "the development of the rational branch
of a subject accomplishes many important things in the advancement of knowledge. Therein reside indispensable mnemonic devices and means of communication.' But divorced from empirical studies, the results are of no practical
value.
The rational side of the law has been skillfully and effectively developed,
but there has been a complete absence of effort to nwthodically develop its
empirical side. This phase of the problem has been well described by Mr.
Cook:'
The judge must know two things in deciding the claim of a particular
plaintiff: "(i) what social consequences or results are to be aimed at; and
(2) how a decision one way or the other will affect the attainment of those
results."
The first requisite is a question of goals, and a categorical issue, impossible of empirical verification.' Opinions in regard to ultimate value are
precipitated from the custom of the people, and from the education and general environment of the judges But the second requisite presents a purely
308.

'Cook, The Scientific Method of the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J.303, at

See also IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (1913).
'The failure to distinguish between final good and functional good has
been the source of much confusion of thought, historically.
'See CARnozo, GROWTH OF THE LAND (1924);

LEGAL Sclxmw

(1928).

CARO, PARAnoxzs

OF

Cf. POUND, LAW & MoRALs (1924) pa.ssim. Reading
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empirical issue, which should not be left prey entirely to the crude methods of
common sense and judicial notice.6 Whenever feasible, it should be the subiect of statistical study,' as is the scientific study of the behaviour of all physical bodies. This would seem to be the crux of the problem of applying the
method of the physical to the social sciences.8 This criticism that this is theoretical seems antiquated. The problem of coordinating theory and practice
exists in medicine, biology and engineering, but does nct discourage theoretical
investigation in those fields.P
This is the keynote of Mr. Rueff's argument. His book is delightfully
and skillfully written, and carefully avoids confusing metaphysical controversies. It is a splendid introduction to the philosophy underlying the modern
physical sciences. The application of the method to the social sciences is
rather inferior to the first part in that it does not seem to grasp sufficiently
the problems which arise from the introduction of functionally defined classes'
It would seem too, that the science of ethics might be more effectively
approached as a study of a specific type of behaviour under varying geographic,
economic and social conditions, rather than as the development of a system of
postulates to explain existing codes of avowed morality." The translation of
this book lives up to the high standard of pioneering work which is being done
by the Johns Hopkins Institute o~f Law.
William F. Kennedy.
Gowen Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
through WGMsoaR, PANORAMA OF T.E Woaw's LEGAL SYsTEMs (1928) one
cannot but be impressed with the force of custom as a criterion of final good.
This would seem to be the more proper field for the application of the rule
of stare decisis.
'HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL Lr.GA CoNcEpros (1923).
In an article
therein entitled "A Vital School of Jurisprudence," Mr. Hohfeld strongly recommends the study of the functional effect of different rules of law.
'Mr. Justice Brandeis, when he appeared as counsel in Muller v. Oregon,
243 U. S. 426; 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (I917)
undertook to bring before the Court,
by inclusion in the brief, pertinent statistical data, legislative practice, scientific discussions by persons of eminence in their profession and so forth, in
support of an hours-of-service law for women. The entire history of the use
of this procedure before the Supreme Court is reviewed in Bile, Questions
of Fact Affecting Constitutionality (1924) 38 HAv. L. Rxv. 6.
'SINGER, op. cit. supra note 2, 64-69, 227 et seq. Difficult problems also
arise because of the necessity of introducing functionally defined classes. Ibid.
Mr. Rueff does not go into these more difficult phases of the application of the
method of the physical to the social sciences.
"See Coox, Introduction to HoEFmE , FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNcEPTIONs
(1919) 21; Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303.
For a splendid example of the application of theoretical scholarship to practical problems, see Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457.
10
Supra note 8.
"A similar suggestion might be made for a behaviouristic approach to
certain mental conceptions used in legal science, such as that of intention. See
the argument of Mr. Justice Holmes, as counsel in RR. v. Mitchell, 6 State
Tr. N. S. 599, 632, quoted in I WicoaE, EvmDEcE (2d ed. 1923) § 301, at
page 612.
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Reprinted from the copy of
1648 edition in the Henry E. Huntington Library. With an Introduction
by Max Farrand. Pages IX, 59. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,

rHE LAWS AND LiBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS.

1929.

The discovery of an original copy of the reprint under review, Joseph
Sabin, the well-known biographer, declared just fifty years ago, "would be a
bibliographical wonder". This "wonder" came to pass some years later
through the discovery in the library of the Mayor of Rye, England, of an
original copy of one of the edition of 6oo ordered printed in 1648. This copy,
after passing through several private hands, eventually came into the possession
of the Huntington Library. It is the only copy known to have been preserved.
The explanation of the disappearance of the other copies, the Editor points
out, is found in a petition of the Treasurer of the colony in i65i, for a reimbursement of funds he had expended for copies of "The Book of Lawes,"
which by reason of emendation of the laws were "unvendable" and "a great
part Turned to Wast Pap'r and many of them Burnt".
Dr. Max Farrand, the Director of the Huntington Library, contributes
a scholarly and informative introduction, in .which he traces the history of the
drafting of the first code of laws of the colony of Massachusetts, known as
"The Body of Liberties" of 1641 and of the revision and expansion of the same
and the publication of the new body of laws in 1648, the unique copy of which
now has been reprinted, in type similar to the original, reproducing "the original
line for line and word for word".
For many years there was much doubt and misunderstanding in regard
to the early laws of Massachusetts. This was in part due to the incompleteness of the Records of the General Court, and in part to the publication in
London in 1641 of a pamphlet entitled "An Abstract of the Lawes of New
England". This document was accepted for years in England and later by
many historians, as the actual code of laws adopted by the General Court in
1641. All doubt in regard to the matter was cleared up by the discovery in the
old Atheneum in Boston of a manuscript copy of the real Body of Liberties
by Francis C. Gray and the publication of the text for the first time in 1843,
accompanied by a brilliant essay in which Mr. Gray established the genuineness
of the document. The Abstract published in London in 1641 was identified as
the draft of the proposed code drawn by John Cotton, and referred to in Governor Winthrop's Journal under date of October 1636 in the following entry:
"Mr. Cotton did this Court present a model of Moses his Judicials". This was
not adopted, but after several years further consideration and procrastination in
which, to again quote Winthrop, "Most of the Magistrates and some of the
Elders were not forward in the matter". The Body of Liberties drafted by
the Rev. Nathaniel Ward, was, after amendment "established for three years".
Excellent as was this code, the general court in the course of the next
few years subjected it to further revision and added several new laws. In the
course of the year 1647 or 648 the laws appear to have been approved and
ordered printed, although no record appears in the minutes of their formal
adoption. The Editor however points out that in the Records of November iI,
1647, a reference is made to "The Lawes now being in a manner agreed upon",
and in March 1648 a further reference is made to "the Amendments of the
bookes of lawes past!'.
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The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes comprised in addition to
the title page and a two-page salutation of the secretary of the colony fiftynine pages of text including all the laws in force, arranged alphabetically according to the subject matter. It has been said truly that this was "the first
attempt at a comprehensive reduction into one form of a body of legislation
of an English speaking country". Although the title page of the original
states it was published by the authorities of the General Court in 1647 and
printed in 1648, the editor selects the later date for the title page of the reprint
as it includes laws passed in 1648. Photostat copies of the original title page
as well as one page of the text are reproduced as illustration.
A few of the outstanding or notable provisions of this code should be
mentioned. The number of capital offenses listed was fifteen, an increase of
three over The Body of Liberties of 1641. Each of these fifteen laws was
supported by Scriptural citations to the Mosaic code. Severe as the Puritan
laws are commonly believed to have been it should be noted that this was a
reduction of over one half in the number of capital crimes under contemporary
English law. The first law establishing public schools in America, passed in
1647, is included in this collection. Its famous preamble beginning "It being
one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from a knowledge
of the Scriptures," etc., is frequently quoted as characteristic of and highly
honorable to the Puritan. Against "idleness" the constables are ordered to
"use speciall care and diligence to take ~knowledge of offenders in this kinde,
especially of common coasters, unprofitable fowlers and tobacco takers" and
to present them to the magistrates. Strict regulations were passed governing
inn-keepers as well as for the punishment of "tippling and drunkeness" as
also laws restricting the use of tobacco. The latter were evidently intended
not only as a preventive against fire but also to guard against its use becoming
an offense to others. Marriage laws were strict. While for the protection
of maids those who tried to draw away their affection under pretense of
marriage, before the consent of their parents had been obtained were subject
to fine and possible imprisonment. The temptation to comment further on
other peculiarities of the code must be resisted.
In conclusion, it remains only to note that by the publication of this volume
there is made available generally to lawyers and students of colonial history
and law an authentic edition of the laws of Massachusetts of 1648, upon which
all its subsequent legislation was based.
Herman V. Ames.
University of Pennsylvania.

(Second Edition.)
By George P. Costigan, Jr. American Casebook Series, West Publishing

COSTIGAN'S CASES-WILS, DESCENT AND ADmITlNISTRATION.

Company, St. Paul, 1929.

Pp. xxi, 888.

Almost twenty years ago the present writer reviewed the original edition
of this casebook. At that time it constituted an isolated volume of the
American Casebook Series-there having been no attempt at that time to coordinate in this Series the subject of Wills and Administration to the other
branches of Property Law. The new edition constitutes the 5th Volume of
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a series co-ordinating the law of property and known as "Cases on the Law of
Property" of the American Casebook Series.
In the years that have passed since the first edition of this work there
nas emanated from the courts a huge volume of new cases. The Editor has
selected with admirable judgment from this wealth of learning, retaining,
however, in many instances, the original cases as still the best representatives
of the particular doctrines. Furthermore, in the space of two decades several
new and important statutes in England on the general subject have been passed
by Parliament. This new legislation has been collated in the Appendix to the
present edition.
The general arrangement of the book follows that of the first edition and
could hardly be improved upon. There are copious notes referring to other
authorities in the decisional law and also much bibliography of textbooks and
legal magazines. The reference to the latter is especially noteworthy as a
means of rescuing from relative oblivion much very able but isolated discussion on important topics in this branch of the law. The Table listing the
cases used as text and also those cited in the footnotes is fairly complete,
but it would have been more helpful if, while preparing this Table, it had been
made to embrace every case referred to ag text or in the notations. The
Appendix, besides notes on the English Statutes brought down to date, also
contains a very helpful section giving instructions concerning the planning and
drafting of Wills.
The original edition contained 781 pages and the present edition 888 pages.
As an exemplar of the publisher's art, the latter edition marks a creditable
advance-not only in the general appearance of the book but in the quality

of the paper as well, and despite the additional paging the present edition is
lighter in weight and thinner in bulk than the former one.

In view of the

present-day cost of library space this latter feature is not to be lightly regarded.
This work is commended to the reader as a worthy example of the con-

tinuing high standards set by the Editor and also his enterprising publisher.
A. J. White Hutton.
Dickinson School of Law.

QUEsTioiD Docu ENTs. (Second Edition.)
Printing Co., Albany, N. Y. 1929.

By A. S. Osborn.

The Boyd

Pp. xxiv, 1O28.

Some years ago a young architect who was giving evidence on the suitability of a new building material was asked, in cross-examination, whether
he presumed to set his opinion against that of a certain famous architect.
"In this case I do," he replied, "for I have more practical knowledge of the
material than he has." This incident is typical of the attitude formerly prevailing in the courts toward expert witnesses. Their testimony generally carried weight in proportion to their reputation. In no branch of human 'affairs
was this attitude more pronounced than in matters concerning documents and
handwriting.
At the present day, however, more weight is assigned, in the majority of
courts at any rate, to the demonstration of facts than to any expression of
opinion. To this welcome change Mr. Osborn has by his writings largely con-
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tributed. He has constantly laid stress upon the importance of proving facts
in such a way that the judge or jury will have before them the salient material
upon which a judgment may be based. And yet he recognizes that it is the
legitimate function of the expert witness not only to direct attention to facts,
many of which would otherwise escape notice, but also to interpret those facts,
for, as Mr. Osborn points out, "the facts alone, even in good cases, do not
often prove themselves, especially against bold perjury and resourceful advocacy". In the thirty-six chapters of his book he demonstrates many of the
different ways in which a document may be made to bear silent testimony
to the truth.
The second edition of Questioned Documents has been long overdue, for
during the nineteen years that have passed since the book's first publication
great advances have been made in the development of scientific methods which
can be applied to the examination of documents.
In the main, the new edition follows the plan adopted in its predecessor.
After chapters dealing fully with the preliminary examination of documents
and the use of the microscope, camera, and various scientific measuring instruments, the subject of handwriting is discussed in a series of chapters which
deal with writing movements, spacing and slant of writing, pen-pressure and
shading, variations in genuine writing, and the process of reasoning on points
of similarity and difference, etc. Then follow chapters on the methods of
examining particular elements of documents, such as ink, pencil writing, paper,
seals, etc.; the sequence of strokes, the evidence of folds, erasures, traced
forgeries, and so on. This part of the book concludes with practical chapters
on legal procedure in connection with documents and their presentation in
court, with the physical preparation of wills and other specific documents, and
with the precautions to be taken against forgery.
Each section of the subject is dealt with critically, and the conclusions
justified by the facts observed are discussed in the light of the author's experience. The well-reproduced illustrations, many of them derived from actual
cases, increase the value of the discussion. If one may pick out for special
mention any particular section of the book, the chapters on traced forgeries
may be chosen as a model of what a scientific demonstration should be. The
excellence of this section is perhaps beightened by the circumstance of its
being a subject upon which the author can speak with unique authority.
On the other hand, if one may criticize without any thought of depreciating, it would have been a welcome addition to the contents of the book if
more attention had been directed to the chemical aspect of the subject under
investigation. For instance, there is no account of the value of analytical
methods o~f distinguishing between different kinds of paper, nor of the methods
of examining charred documents, ind while a few tests for distinguishing
between inks are mentioned, there is no reference to the well established fact
that it is possible to distinguish between the pigments of different copying-ink
pencils. The remark that the differentiation by chemical means of the marks
made by ordinary blacklead pencils on paper is "practically impossible" requires qualification, for graphites containing impurities, such as iron or even
titanium, which can be recognized by micro-chemical tests are not of such
rare occurrence as the author's words would suggest.
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The second part of the work, a part which did not appear in the first
edition, contains a classified list of legal citations occupying 280 pages. This
section will be found invaluable as a concise summary of American case law
on all topics associated with documents or handwriting. Finally, there is a very
full bibliography with an alphabetical arrangement of the authors' names together with Mr. Osborn's critical comments on the various books.
Regarded as a whole, the new edition of Questioned Documents more than
maintains the commanding position, won by the first edition, of a standard
text, and it is to be warmly recommended to everyone whose work is directly.
or indirectly concerned with the examination of documents or with the presentation of documentary evidence in courts of law.
C. Ainsworth Mitchell.
London, England.

RESEARCH IN !NTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONALiTY; REsPONSmiLiTy OF STATES;
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., 1929.
TFRaiToRmiL WATERS.

Pp. vii, 399.
On September 22, 1924, the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations
requested the Council to convene a committee of experts to prepare a provisional list of subjects of international law apparently suited to regulation
by convention, to submit this list through the Secretariat to the governments
of all States, and to report to the Council on the questions sufficiently ripe
for codification. Such a committee of experts was appointed, which included
an American member, the Honorable George W. Wickersham, and which held
meetings in 1925, i926 and 1927, studying the field, circularizing governments,
and considering their answers. It reported seven subjects as ripe for codification, and this report the Council transmitted to the Eighth Assembly. This
Assembly chose three subjects for submission to an International Conference
which is to be convened at the Hague in i93o. The subjects chosen are Nationality, Territorial Waters, and Responsibility of States for *Damage Done
in their Territory to the Person or Property o~f Foreigners. A preparatory
Committee of Five was also provided for to prepare a report as a basis of
discussion at the conference.
In view of the action of the Eighth Assembly in September, 1927, the
Faculty of the Harvard Law School undertook to organize in November of
that year, a Research in International Law "for the purpose of preparing a
draft of an international convention on each of the three subjects selected by
the Eighth Assembly to be dealt with at the First Conference on the Codification of International Law". This Research was set up under the direction of
an Advisory Committee of forty-four members, representing teachers of international law and members of the Bar who have had wide international experience in practice or in government service. This Committee appointed Manley
0. Hudson, Director, Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Reporter on Nationality, Edwin
M. Borchard, Reporter on Responsibility, and George Grafton Wilson, Reporter on Territorial Waters. With each Reporter was associated a group of
advisers, and five or six extended meetings were held by each group with its
Reporter and the Director, between February 1928, and January 1929. Their
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work was finally passed upon by the Advisory Committee in February, 1929,
and ordered printed.
It would be difficult to put too high a value upon the project undertaken
by the Research in International Law which is consummated in the Drafts
and Comments contained in the volume under review. This project enlisted
the aid of -the most competent scholars of international law in this country.
It has resulted in drafts of conventions in the three fields in question, which
were formulated in the hope that they may prove useful in connection with
the forthcoming Conference at the Hague. These draft conventions are accompanied by extensive "comments", giving historical background, discussing
conflicting views of the law, and furnishing illustrations of the operation of
the rules suggested. While none of the work represents throughout the views
of any individual, the publication of all was approved by Reporters, Advisers
and the Advisory Committee as the collective work of the group.
Professor Hudson, and the Harvard Faculty are to be congratulated upon
sponsoring so useful a piece of work. It served as a stimulus to those who
participated in it, it has helped to clarify the rules of international law for
American scholars in at least three fields, and it will undoubtedly be helpful
to all of the delegates who will convene at the Hague next spring to attempt
to make a beginning of systematic codification of international law by convention.
Charles K. Burdick.
Cornell Law School.
LAws OF PENNSYLVANIA

RELATING To SOCIAL

The Public Charities Ass'n of Penna. (1929).

Woaic. By John S. Bradway.
Pp. 261.

During the years that he was an active member of the Philadelphia Bar,
Mr. Bradway was that refreshing type of lawyer who gave liberally of his
time and efforts in many fields of social service. He did splendid work in
organizing Legal Aid societies throughout the country, served in an advisory
capacity with a number of relief agencies in Philadelphia, identified himself
with the present movement to place a Voluntary Defender in the criminal
courts, and in many other ways contributed to the cause of social welfare.
His report as amicus curie in the celebrated Ellis College case, recently in our
Orphans' Court, is a mhasterly combination of the legal and humanitarian
phases of the interesting situation which that matter presented. Within the
past several months a special number of the Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Sciences was issued under his editorship on the subject
of "Law and Social Welfare."
In his introduction to that volume Mr. Bradway says that "Law is one
method of solving human problems." Perhaps it was for the purpose of
translating this thought into practical channels that he compiled_.th present
book at the request of the Public Charities Association of Pennsylvania. More
and more our courts are concerned with questions that deal with, and often
are inspired by, social welfare. The last twenty-five years have witnessed
the passage in this state o.f a great mass of laws dealing with the Juvenile
Court, the Domestic Relations Court, the welfare of women and children,
workmen's compensation, mental diseases, and similar legislation.

BOOK REVIEWS
Very few lawyers have had the interest to keep in touch with this-phase
of statutory law, because much of it has been outside of the routine of their
own practice. For them Mr. Bradway's book will be a convenient reference
volume on the occasions when a client-rather than any humanitarian urgeleads them to seek the provisions of a statute relating to social welfare.
The book will also be of immense value to the enlarging field of social
workers. Not so many years ago such persons were consumed with a fine
impatience at the intrusion of legal phases into their special domain. But
they have come to learn that far reaching measures like the Child Labor Law,
the School Code, and the Juvenile Court Act must be constantly interpreted by
our courts, if the reforms such acts achieved are to continue.
Mr. Bradway has intelligently grouped the considerable mass of statutes
relating to social work under eleven subjects and has painstakingly correlated
the acts of Assembly which have a state wide application. Federal -laws and
ordinances and acts of a local character have been generally omitted. It is
to be regretted that the references to case law are abbreviated. There has
been during the past twenty years a most interesting line of cases upon almost
every subject included in this volume, and a more extended review of these
cases would have added much to the completeness of a book which in other
respects is so satisfactory.
Charles Edwin Fox.
Philadelphia,Pa.

By Henry Merritt
Wriston. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1929. - Pp. xii, 874.

ExEcuTE AGENTS IN AmEICAN FORmGN REATIoNs.

This volume of the Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1923, is
a distinct contribution to the literature on American diplomacy. Part I is devoted to the origin and constitutional position of executive agents sent abroad,
and Part II to the range of practice during one hundred and forty years.
Both evidence a close study of documents. Nothing is given second hand.
The facts are scrupulously garnered, and conclusions based on them are moderate and sustained.
The importance of the subject has been much emphasized by events in
our recent history. The effort to limit the President's control of our international relations is a constant one, and its success may be fraught with serious consequences for the United States. The statute of March 4, 1913, hat
':hereafter the Executive shall not extend or accept any invitation to participate in any international congress, conference, or like event, without first having
specific authority of law to do so," has already brought unfortunate results.
It was an eleventh-hour amendment to an appropriation bill, signed by President Taft on the day he left office. Mr. Wriston says (p. 129) that "it
had not an instant of consideration, and was agreed to without a word of
comment either explanatory or critical." Yet it is precisely in this haphazard
way that precedents have grown up affecting the allocation of constitutional
power over our relations with other peoples. The result today is a popular
impression that the conduct of such relations is committed to both the President and the Senate, and the latter is continually seeking to fill such a role.
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Nowhere was this more evident than in the Senate's adoption of the resolution
concerning adhesion to the Protocol of Signature of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, on January 27, 16, when it stipulated that "the
signature of the United States to the said Protocol shall not be affxed until
the Powers signatory to such Protocol shall have indicated, through an exchange of notes, their acceptance" of the Senate's reservations. The Government of the United States will find itself greatly handicapped in any efficient conduct of our international relations if it is subject to such dictation
by a legislative body.
Mr. Wriston has set forth in admirable fashion the history of this struggle, and his book gives us for the first time a satisfactory analysis of this
phase of national history. It should serve as an indispensable manual for all
who have to do with our diplomatic relations, and one could wish that a copy
might rest on every Senator's desk.
Of particular interest is a chapter devoted to agents sent by the United
States to unrecognized states and governments (Chapter VII). The history
of numerous instances in which the United States has perforce entered into
informal relations with such governments affords little basis for much of the
current discussion of our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This is but one of many instances of the usefulness of this volume.
Manley 0. Hudson.
Harvard Law School.

